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Abstract
We explore in this paper the implications of ethical and operational principles for
the evaluation of population health. We formalize those principles as axioms for social
preferences over distributions of health for a given population. We single out several fo-
cal population health evaluation functions, which represent social preferences, as a result
of combinations of those axioms. Our results provide rationale for popular theories in
health economics (such as the unweighted aggregation of QALYs or HYEs, and general-
izations of the two, aimed to capture concerns for distributive justice) without resorting
to controversial assumptions over individual preferences.
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1 Introduction
The goal of all health services activities and programs is to improve the health of people. Such
a goal places a central role to the definition and measurement of benefit in health care, as well
as how it should be distributed in a population. It is not surprising that, over the years, there
has been considerable interest and activity in developing methods to measure quantitatively the
health status of individuals and populations (e.g., Torrance, 1986). Economists, practitioners
and social scientists alike have long been concerned with this issue. Attempts to develop
appealing measures to evaluate the health of a population abound in the literature (e.g., Pliskin
et al., 1980; Torrance, 1986; Mehrez and Gafni, 1989; Wagstaﬀ, 1991; Bleichrodt, 1995, 1997;
Williams, 1997; Dolan, 1998, 2000; Murray et al., 2002; Bleichrodt et al., 2004; Guerrero and
Herrero, 2005; Østerdal, 2005; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009).
The purpose of this paper is to take the axiomatic approach to the evaluation of population
health, a somewhat unexplored approach in the health economics literature, in contrast to
many other fields in economics. An axiomatic study begins with the specification of a domain
of problems, and the formulation of a list of desirable properties (axioms) of solutions for the
domain, whereas it ends with (as complete as possible) descriptions of the families of solutions
satisfying various combinations of the properties (e.g., Thomson, 2001). An axiomatic study
often results in characterization theorems. They are theorems identifying a particular solution,
or perhaps a family of solutions, as the only solution or family of solutions, satisfying a given
list of axioms. This is precisely what we aim to do in this paper.
It has been frequently argued that the benefit that a patient derives from a particular health
care intervention is defined according to two dimensions: quality of life and quantity of life.
We endorse such assumption in our model. More precisely, we assume that the distribution
of health in a population is defined by a collection of duplets, each indicating the status that
an agent of the population achieves in the two dimensions: health (quality of life) and time
(quantity of life). We shall refer to those distributions as population health distributions. We,
however, departure from earlier contributions within the health-economics literature, to deal
with the evaluation of health distributions, which presume an implicit relationship between the
two dimensions at the individual level (e.g., Bleichrodt, 1995, 1997; Østerdal, 2005; Bleichrodt
et al., 2004; Doctor et al., 2009). In other words, we do not assume from the outset the existence
of an index summarizing the information of each duplet. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, we
implicitly derive indices of that sort as a result of combining our axioms.
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Our ultimate goal in this paper will be to single out, as a result of combining several axioms
reflecting ethical and operational principles, specific measures to evaluate population health
distributions. The key tool of our work to achieve that goal will be what we call a population
health evaluation function (“PHEF” hereafter). A PHEF is a mapping that associates with each
population health distribution a real number intended to perform comparisons among them and,
hence, reflect social preferences over those distributions. We shall single out several PHEFs,
each reflecting well-known natural views in the economic appraisal of health care programmes
for resource allocation decisions. The axiomatic characterizations leading to these PHEFs will
allow us to scrutinize their relative virtues by means of comparing the principles (axioms) that
drive each of them.
One of the PHEFs we shall single out is the so-called linear QALY function, which eval-
uates population health by means of the unweighted aggregation of quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs). In contrast to the literature dealing with this focal and common procedure to aggre-
gate health benefits in economic evaluations of health care, we derive it without imposing any
structure on individual preferences over health. As a result, we avoid one of the main criticisms
of the QALY measure, namely that it relies on restrictive assumptions over individual prefer-
ences (e.g., Loomes and McKenzie, 1989). We shall also single out the so-called linear HYE
function, which evaluates population health by means of the unweighted aggregation of healthy
years equivalents (HYEs). In doing so, we shall be able to scrutinize further the similarities
and diﬀerences between these two focal concepts (HYEs and QALYs) in health economics, an
aspect that has received considerable attention in the literature (e.g., Mehrez and Gafni, 1989;
Culyer and Wagstaﬀ, 1993; Gafni et al., 1993; Bleichrodt, 1995).
Both PHEFs (linear QALY and linear HYE) dismiss a concern for distributive justice in
the evaluation process of population health distributions. They simply focus on the aggregate
number (of QALYs or HYEs) that a distribution delivers. We also characterize in this paper
PHEFs modifying the previous two in order to capture concerns for distributive justice. As
we shall see later, the resulting PHEFs, which are also inspired by classical contributions in
the economics literature, are closely connected to other proposals in the literature on health
economics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and the
axioms we study. In Section 3, we present the PHEFs and their characterization results. We
discuss the results and some possible extensions in Section 4. For a smooth passage, we defer
the proofs and provide them in an appendix.
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2 The preliminaries
We consider a policy maker who has to make a choice between distributions of health for a
population of fixed size  ≥ 3. We identify the population (society) with the set  = {1  }.
The health of each individual in the population will be described by a duplet indicating the
level achieved in two parameters: quality of life and quantity of life. Assume that there exists a
set of possible health states, , defined generally enough to encompass all possible health states
for everybody in the population. We emphasize that  is an abstract set without any particular
mathematical structure.1 Quantity of life will simply be described by a set of nonnegative real
numbers,  ⊂ R. In what follows, and unless otherwise stated, we assume that  = [0+∞).
Formally, let  = ( ) ∈  ×  denote the health duplet of individual .2 A population
health distribution (or, simply, a health profile)  = [1     ] = [(1 1)  ( )] specifies
the health duplet of each individual in society. We denote the set of all possible health profiles
by , i.e.,  is the -Cartesian product of the set  ×  . Even though we do not impose a
specific mathematical structure on the set , we assume that it contains a specific element, ∗,
which we refer to as perfect health and which is univocally identified, as a “superior” state, by
all agents in the population.
The policy maker’s preferences (or social preferences) over health profiles are expressed by
a preference relation %, to be read as “at least as preferred as”. As usual, Â denotes strict
preference and ∼ denotes indiﬀerence. We assume that the relation % is a weak order, i.e., it
is complete (for each health profiles  0, either  % 0, or 0 % , or both) and transitive (if
 % 0 and 0 % 00 then  % 00).
A population health evaluation function (PHEF) is a real-valued function  :  → R We
say that  represents % if
 () ≥  (0)⇔  % 0
for each  0 ∈ . Note that if  represents % then any strictly increasing transformation of
 would also do so.
The model we just outlined has at least two possible interpretations. On the one hand, the
pair ( ) is identifying an agent having a chronic (or “average") health state  throughout
a (remaining) lifetime of length . In this sense, the model can be used to express a social
1 could for instance refer to the resulting multidimensional health states after combining the levels of each
dimension of a categorical measure, such as EQ-5D, in all possible ways.
2For ease of exposition, we establish the notational convention that  ≡ ()∈ , for each  ⊂  .
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planner’s preference over societies (of the same size) with diﬀerent distributions of the citizens
health states and (remaining) life years. On the other hand, we may think of the scenario in
which the planner launches an intervention and this intervention results in a health state 
for a period of time  for each agent  in the society, relative to some status-quo distribution.
Diﬀerent interventions can then be compared on the basis of their resulting distributions of
health states and time periods.
2.1 Axioms
We now list the axioms for social preferences that we consider in this paper. As we shall see,
each of them will reflect an ethical or an operational principle.
Our first axiom, anonymity, is a standard formalization of the principle of impartiality,
which refers to the fact that ethically irrelevant information is excluded from the evaluation
process. In other words, the identity of agents should not matter and the evaluation of the
population health should depend only on the list of quality-quantity duplets, not on who holds
them. Formally, let Π denote the class of bijections from  into itself. Then,
ANON:  ∼  for each  ∈  and each  ∈ Π 
The next axiom, separability, underlies the use of incremental analysis in cost-eﬀectiveness
analysis, which implies that individuals for whom two treatments yield the same health should
not influence the relative evaluation of these treatments (e.g., Gold et al., 1996; Turpcu et al.,
2011). More precisely, it says that if the distribution of health in a population changes only for
a subgroup of agents in the population, the relative evaluation of the two distributions should
only depend on that subgroup.3 Formally,
SEP:
£ \¤ % £0 \¤⇔ h 0\i % h0 0\i, for each  ⊆  , and  0 ∈ .
The next axiom, perfect health superiority, refers to the superiority of the state of perfect
health. More precisely, it says that replacing the health status of an agent by that of perfect
health, ceteris paribus, cannot worsen the evaluation of the population health. It constitutes
the closest approximation in our context to the Pareto principle of optimality, and it also reflects
a certain notion of solidarity, a principle with a long tradition of use in the theory of justice
(e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006).
3The notion of separability has a long tradition of use in models of cooperative decision making (e.g., Moulin,
1988).
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PHS: For each  = [1     ] ∈  and  ∈  , let ∗ = (∗ ). Then, [∗  \{}] % .
A somewhat related axiom comes next. Time monotonicity at perfect health says that if
each agent is at perfect health, increasing the time dimension is strictly better for society.
Formally,
TMPH: If, for each  ∈  ,  ≥ 0, at least one strict, then [(∗ 1)     (∗ )] Â [(∗ 01)     (∗ 0)].
We then move to an axiom, healthy years equivalence, which says that any population health
distribution has a socially equivalent one in which the health outcome of one (and only one)
agent is replaced by that of full health, for some quantity of time.4 Formally,
HYE: For each  ∈  and  ∈  there exists ∗ such that  ∼ [\{} (∗ ∗ )]
Note that the HYE axiom only postulates that, for each agent and health profile, a “healthy
years equivalent” exists, but not how it should be determined as a function of the health profile.
Continuity is the adaptation to our context of a usual axiom. It says that for fixed dis-
tributions of health states, the population health ordering is smooth in lifetimes. In spite of
being an apparently technical condition, it is also an ethically attractive axiom. It models
non-arbitrariness of the social preferences.
CONT: Let  0 ∈  and () be a sequence in such that, for each  ∈  , () = ( () )→
( ) = . If () % 0 for each  then  % 0.
The next axiom, social zero condition, is reminiscent of a widely used condition for individual
utility functions on health (e.g., Bleichrodt et al., 1997; Miyamoto et al., 1998; Østerdal 2005).
It says that if an agent gets zero lifetime, then his/her health state does not influence the social
desirability of the health distribution. Formally,
ZERO: For each  ∈  and  ∈  such that  = 0, and 0 ∈  \ {},  ∼ [\{} (0 0)]
The following axiom, time invariance at common health, refers to the equal value of life gains
for persons with common health states. Thus, it conveys an absence of lifetime discrimination:
an individual is not less worthy of treatment on the sole grounds that he/she has a longer
4This notion can be traced back to Mehrez and Gafni (1989) who propose it as a plausible way to reflect
patient’s preferences over health.
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lifetime.5 Formally,
TICH: For each  ∈    0, and   ∈  , such that  = ,£
(  + ) ( ) \{}¤ ∼ £( ) (  + ) \{}¤ 
Time invariance at perfect health is the weakening of the above axiom to the case in which
the common health state is precisely the perfect health state. Formally,
TIPH: For each  ∈    0, and   ∈  , such that  =  = ∗,£
(  + ) ( ) \{}¤ ∼ £( ) (  + ) \{}¤ 
The last axiom we consider, time scale independence, says that evaluations should not de-
pend on the variable we use to measure quantity of life (e.g., days, months, years). More
precisely, it says that the ranking of a pair of population health distributions does not re-
verse when all lifetimes are multiplied by a common positive constant.6 The individual level
counterpart to this axiom is often referred to in the literature as the constant proportional
trade-oﬀ assumption (e.g., Pliskin et al., 1980). Previous experimental studies have provided
mixed support for such assumption (e.g., Attema and Brouwer, 2010), with mostly person and
context-specific violations. Thus, we believe it may be more acceptable for a planner to assume
scale independence in time for social preferences rather than for individual preferences.
TSI: For each   0, and  = [( )∈ ], 0 = [(0 0)∈ ],
 % 0 ⇒ [( )∈ ] % [(0 0)∈ ]
A plausible weakening of the previous axiom, time scale independence at perfect health, says
that the notion only applies when restricted to perfect health. Formally,
TSIPH: For each   0, and  = [(∗ )∈ ], 0 = [(∗ 0)∈ ],
 % 0 ⇒ [(∗ )∈ ] % [(∗ 0)∈ ]
3 Axiomatic characterizations
We provide in this section the main results of this paper, which characterize a group of focal
PHEFs.
5This axiom is very similar, although not identical, to the so-called non-age dependence axiom in Østerdal
(2005).
6Østerdal (2005) considers a counterpart of this axiom in his context.
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The most widely employed way of combining the quality of life and quantity of life derived
from a particular health care intervention is by means of QALYs. The following PHEF, which
we call linear QALY, evaluates population health distributions by means of the unweighted
aggregation of individual QALYs in society, or, in other words, by the weighted (through
health levels) aggregate time span the distribution yields. Formally,
 [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
() (1)
where  : → [0 1] is an arbitrary function satisfying 0 ≤ () ≤ (∗) = 1, for each  ∈ .
Our first result says that the linear QALY PHEF is characterized by the combination of the
six structural axioms ANON, SEP, PHS, TMPH, HYE and CONT plus the specific axioms of
ZERO and TICH. Formally,
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (1).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT, ZERO and TICH.
An alternative way of combining the quality of life and quantity of life derived from a
particular health care intervention is by means of HYEs. The next PHEF, which we call linear
HYE, evaluates population health distributions by means of the aggregation of individuals’
HYEs. Formally,
 [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
( ) (2)
where  :  ×  →  is a function indicating the HYEs for each possible individual, i.e., for
each  = [1     ] = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ ,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
Our second result characterizes the linear HYE PHEF by another combination of the axioms
stated above. Formally,
Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (2).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT and TIPH.
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As we can observe from the statements of the two theorems, disregarding ZERO and weak-
ening TICH, so that the axiom is restricted to the case in which the common health state is
the perfect health state) allows us to move from the (linear) QALY PHEF to the much broader
family of (linear) HYE PHEFs.
Both (linear) PHEFs highlighted above amount unweighted aggregation across individuals,
an aspect usually criticized by its lack of concern for distributive justice (e.g., Loomes and
McKenzie, 1989; Wagstaﬀ, 1991; Dolan, 1998). We introduce next two PHEFs, which generalize
the above two, in order to capture such a concern. They simply introduce suitable powers in
the QALYs (or HYEs) each agent in the population gets. The rationale behind this idea can
be traced back to Bergson (e.g., Burk, 1936). In a health-economics context, power functions
of QALYs were introduced, at an individual level, by Pliskin et al., (1980). The so-called
Bergsonian approach has also been discussed in the health-economics literature by Wagstaﬀ
(1991) and Williams (1997), among others.
Formally, the power QALY PHEF is defined as:
 [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
()  (3)
where  : → [0 1] is an arbitrary function satisfying 0 ≤ () ≤ (∗) = 1, for each  ∈ ,
and  ∈ R++ is a positive scalar.
Likewise, the power HYE PHEF is defined as:
 [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
( ) (4)
where  ∈ R++ is a positive scalar, and  : ×  →  is a function indicating the HYEs for
each possible individual, i.e., for each  = [1     ] = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ ,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
The characterizations of both families come next.7
Theorem 3 The following statements are equivalent:
7One might find natural to restrict both families to those PHEFs corresponding to  ≤ 1. It turns out
that the following characterization results stated in Theorems 3 and 4 could be enriched to characterize the
subsequent families, upon adding a Pigou-Dalton transfer axiom stating that a health profile in which two
agents at perfect health have diﬀerent time spans is dominated by the subsequent profile in which those agents
keep the same perfect health status, but share a time span equal to the average of the former two.
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1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (3).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT and TSI.
Theorem 4 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (4).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT and TSIPH.
It is worth noting that ZERO is not needed in Theorem 3, as opposed to the counterpart
characterization of the linear QALY PHEF at Theorem 1. Other than that, the parallelism
between Theorems 2 and 4 mimics the parallelism between Theorems 1 and 3.
4 Discussion
We have presented in this paper a new axiomatic approach to the evaluation of population
health. Contrary to most of the previous axiomatic work within the field, we have considered
a model in which no considerations about individual preferences over health have been made.
The reasons for it are threefold. First, it is well known that individual preferences over health
profiles are diﬃcult to articulate/assess (e.g., Dolan, 2000). Second, and partly motivated
by concerns for distributive justice, it has been argued that person trade-oﬀ information (in
contrast to individual preference information) should provide the basis for making priorities.8
Third, it has been argued elsewhere that widely used representations of individual preferences
for health (such as QALYs) rely on fairly restrictive assumptions (e.g. Loomes and McKenzie,
1989; Mehrez and Gafni, 1989). Thus, the aim of this paper was to consider a framework in
which information on individual preferences over health is not available, either for practical or
ethical reasons, but in which sound decisions over the evaluation of population health could
still be made.
Somewhat related, even though we assume (as customary) that individual health is deter-
mined by two dimensions (quality and quantity) we do not presume that individuals evaluate
them in a specific given way. In other words, as opposed to earlier axiomatic contributions on
the evaluation of health profiles, we do not assume that the health of an individual is summa-
rized by a number (to be interpreted as the number of QALYs, life years, or “health utility”
experienced by a person), but by a duplet referring to the two dimensions.
8This is, for instance, the case of the so-called Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study.
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Our aim has been to derive specific representations of social preferences over population
health distributions as a result of combining several ethical and operational axioms. We believe
our axioms are compelling from a normative viewpoint (although, obviously, some to a higher
extent than others). The positive appeal of our axioms has not been tested in this paper.
Nevertheless, there exists a wide variety of experimental contributions testing empirically some
of the principles (or related ideas) over which our axioms rely in related contexts (e.g., Spencer,
2003; Doctor et al., 2004; Spencer and Robinson, 2007; Turpcu et al., 2011). The test of the
precise axioms we use in our specific context is left for further research. We, nevertheless, would
remain cautious about the eventual results of such a venture. As Amos Tversky, one of the
leading scholars in the positive approach to decision theory put it, “give me an axiom and I will
design a questionnaire so that the majority of the people will reject it” (e.g., Gilboa, 2009).
We have characterized two focal representations of social preferences over population health
distributions; namely, the linear QALY and HYE representations. They translate into our
context two of the most well-known and employed techniques to measure the benefits of health
interventions in cost-utility analyses. Those techniques were initially considered as polars,
although some of their diﬀerences and similar aspects were addressed (e.g., Mehrez and Gafni,
1989; Culyer and Wagstaﬀ, 1993; Gafni et al., 1993; Bleichrodt, 1995). We have seen in this
paper that they share a solid common ground. To wit, their characterizations share many
axioms (anonymity, separability, continuity, perfect health superiority, time monotonicity at
perfect health and healthy years equivalence) and diﬀer only in a few (the linear QALY also
requires time invariance at common health, and the social zero condition, whereas the linear
HYE only requires time invariance at perfect health on top of the common axioms).
Our study has focussed on distributions of populations with equal size. Nevertheless, the
analysis could be extended to distributions of variable population size. A plausible way to do so
would be relying on a standard axiom in welfare economics, known as replication invariance.9
Adding such axiom to our theorems would allow us to characterize the counterpart variable-
population versions of our PHEFs.
To conclude, it is also worth commenting on another important aspect of our model. We
have not dealt with uncertainty in our analysis.10 More precisely, we have considered a formu-
9See Blackorby et al. (2006) for a scrutiny of that axiom, as well as other related population issues in welfare
economics.
10Broome (1993) argues that uncertainty is a complication rather than an essential part of the problem of
valuing lives, and it ought not to be introduced into the analysis.
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lation of the population health evaluation problem which contains no explicit element of risk,
and in which we obtain characterizations of population health evaluation functions without
assumptions on the social planner’s (or individuals’) risk attitudes. Rather than a limitation,
we see this aspect of our analysis as an advantage, as it allows us to escape from the usual
critiques of the expected utility theory that are normally considered in the health economics
literature (e.g., Bleichrodt et al., 2001).
5 Appendix. Proofs
In order to prove our theorems, we introduce first an auxiliary lemma, which is interesting on
its own, that characterizes a general family of PHEFs by means of combining the six structural
axioms of anonymity, separability, perfect health superiority, time monotonicity at perfect
health, healthy years equivalence and continuity. Formally, separable PHEFs are defined as
follows:
  [1     ] =   [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
 (( ))  (5)
where  : × → R+ is a continuous function with respect to its second variable and satisfying
0 ≤ ( ) ≤ , for each ( ) ∈  ×  , and  ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ], and  : R+ → R is a
strictly increasing and continuous function.
Lemma 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (5).
2. % satisfies ANON, SEP, PHS, TMPH, HYE and CONT.
Proof. We focus on the non-trivial implication. Formally, assume % satisfies ANON, SEP,
PHS, TMPH, HYE and CONT. Let  ∈ . By HYE, for each  ∈  , there exists ∗ such
that  ∼ [\{} (∗ ∗ )] By SEP, ∗ only depends on ( ) (and, thus, is independent of the
remaining duplets of the profile). Thus, for each  = 1     , let  :  ×  → R be defined
such that ( ) = ∗ , for each ( ) ∈ ×  . By ANON, (· ·) ≡ (· ·) ≡ (· ·), for each
  ∈  . By TMPH and PHS, 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ , for each ( ) ∈ ×  and, by CONT,  is
a continuous function with respect to its second variable. Furthermore,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
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which implicitly says that social preferences only depend on the profile of healthy years equiva-
lents, and, by CONT, they do so continuously. It also follows that the range of  is a connected
subset of R. By Theorem 3 in Debreu (1960), there exists a strictly increasing and continuous
function  : R+ → R such that
 % 0 ⇐⇒
X
=1
 (( )) ≥
X
=1
 ((0 0)) 
which concludes the proof.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2→ 1. Formally, assume % satisfies ANON, SEP,
PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT, ZERO and TICH. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists  : × → R+
and  : R+ → R such that:
•  is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ , for each ( ) ∈ ×  , and
•  is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Furthermore, for each  = [1     ] = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ ,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
and, for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , and 0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈ ,
 % 0 ⇐⇒
X
=1
 (( )) ≥
X
=1
 ((0 0)) 
Without loss of generality, let us assume that ((ˆ 0)) = 0 for some ˆ ∈ .
Let ¯ ∈  be an arbitrary health state. Then, by iterated application of TICH, and the
transitivity of %,
X
=1
 ((¯ )) = 
Ã

Ã
¯
X
=1

!!
+ (− 1) ((¯ 0)) 
By ZERO,  ((¯ 0)) =  ((ˆ 0)) = 0 Thus,
X
=1
 ((¯ )) = 
Ã

Ã
¯
X
=1

!!

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It then follows that  ((¯ ·)) satisfies
((¯ 1 + 2)) = ((¯ 1)) + ((¯ 2))
for any 1 2 ∈  , which is precisely one of Cauchy’s canonical functional equations. As
((¯ ·)) is a continuous function, it follows that the unique solutions to such equation are the
linear functions (e.g., Aczel, 2006; page 34). More precisely, there exists a function ˆ : → R
such that
((¯ )) = ˆ(¯)
for each ¯ ∈ , and  ∈  . By PHS and TMPH, it follows that 0 ≤ ˆ(∗) and ˆ() ≤ ˆ(∗), for
each  ∈ . We now show that ˆ() ≥ 0, for each  ∈ . To do so, let  ∈ . By HYE and
SEP, there exists  ∈  such that ˆ() = (( 1)) = ((∗ )). By TMPH and ZERO,
((∗ )) ≥ ((∗ 0)) = ((ˆ 0)) = 0. Altogether, it says that ˆ() ≥ 0. To conclude, let
 :  → R be such that () = ˆ()ˆ(∗) , for each  ∈ . Then, it follows from the above that
0 ≤ () ≤ (∗) = 1, for each  ∈ . Thus, % is represented by a PHEF satisfying (1), as
desired.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2→ 1. Formally, assume % satisfies ANON, SEP,
PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT and TIPH. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists  :  ×  → R+
continuous with respect to its second variable, and satisfying that 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ , for each
( ) ∈ ×  , such that, for each  = [1     ] = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ ,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
Let  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , and 0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈ . Then, by iterated
application of TIPH, and the transitivity of %,
 % 0 ⇐⇒ [(∗
X
∈
( )) (∗ 0)∈\{}] % [(∗
X
∈
(0 0)) (∗ 0)∈\{}]
By PHS, and the transitivity of %,
 % 0 ⇐⇒ X
∈
( ) ≥
X
∈
(0 0)
as desired.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2→ 1. Formally, assume % satisfies ANON, SEP,
PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT and TSI. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists  :  ×  → R+ and
 : R+ → R such that:
•  is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ , for each ( ) ∈ ×  , and
•  is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Furthermore, for each  = [1     ] = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ ,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
and, for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , and 0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈ ,
 % 0 ⇐⇒
X
=1
 (( )) ≥
X
=1
 ((0 0)) 
Step 1. We claim that for each ( ) (0 0) ∈ ×  , and   0,
( ) ≥ (0 0) ⇐⇒ ( ) ≥ (0 0)
Indeed, let  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈  and   0. Denote  = [(1 1)     ( )] and
let ( ) (0 0) ∈ ×  . By (5),
[( ) \{}] % [(0 0) \{}] ⇐⇒ ( ) ≥ (0 0)
and
[( ) \{}] % [(0 0) \{}] ⇐⇒ ( ) ≥ (0 0)
By TSI,
[( ) \{}] % [(0 0) \{}] ⇐⇒ [( ) \{}] % [(0 0) \{}]
The transitivity of % concludes.
Step 2. We now claim the following. Let ¯ :  → R be such that ¯(−) = (− 1), for
each − ∈ . Then,
( ) ≥ (0 0) ⇐⇒ ¯() ≥ ¯(0)0
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for each ( ) (0 0) ∈ ×  .
Indeed, by definition, ( 1) = (∗ ¯()). By Step 1,
( ) = (0 0) ⇐⇒ ( ) = (0 0)
Thus, ( ) = ¯(), as desired.
Step 3. There exists   0 such that, for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , and
0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈ ,
 % 0 ⇐⇒
X
=1
(¯()) ≥
X
=1
(¯(0)0) 
Let  denote the PHEF defined by11
 [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
 (¯()) 
By Step 2, (· ·) is a monotonic transformation of the function  : ×  → R defined by
( ) = ¯(), for each   ∈ ×  . Then, by (5),  represents %. By TSI,
X
=1
 (¯()−) ≥
X
=1
 ¡¯(0)0−¢ ⇐⇒ X
=1
 (¯()−) ≥
X
=1
 ¡¯(0)0−¢ 
for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , 0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈  and   0.
By Bergson and Samuelson (e.g., Burk, 1936; Samuelson, 1965), there are only three possible
functional forms for  :
•  [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =P=1  (¯()) 
•  [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] = −P=1  (¯()) 
•  [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =P=1  log (¯()) 
for some   0,   0 and sequence {} such that   0 for each  ∈  , and for each
 = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈  such that   0, for each  ∈  . It is straightforward to show
that the last two functional forms cannot be continuously extended to the whole domain , in
which zero time spans are allowed. By ANON,  =  for each   ∈  . Finally, let  : → R
be such that () = ¯(), for each  ∈ . Altogether, we have that  =  , as desired.
11The proof of this step follows closely the argument of the proof of Theorem 8 in Østerdal (2005).
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We focus on the non-trivial implication, i.e., 2→ 1. Formally, assume % satisfies ANON, SEP,
PHS, TMPH, HYE, CONT and TSIPH. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists  : ×  → R+ and
 : R+ → R such that:
•  is continuous with respect to its second variable,
• 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ , for each ( ) ∈ ×  , and
•  is a strictly increasing and continuous function.
Furthermore, for each  = [1     ] = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ ,
 ∼ [(∗ ( ))∈ ]
and, for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , and 0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈ ,
 % 0 ⇐⇒
X
=1
 (( )) ≥
X
=1
 ((0 0)) 
By TSIPH,
X
=1
 (( )) ≥
X
=1
 ((0 0)) ⇐⇒
X
=1
 (( )) ≥
X
=1
 ((0 0)) 
for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , 0 = [(01 01)     (0 0)] ∈  and   0.
Let  be a PHEF representing %. As in the proof of Theorem 3, by Bergson and Samuelson,
ANON, and the requirement that  represent % in the whole domain , it follows that
 [1     ] =  [(1 1)     ( )] =
X
=1
(( )) 
for some   0, and for each  = [(1 1)     ( )] ∈ , which concludes the proof.
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